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“The clear connection between the anti-imperialist movement and earlier 
movements for liberal reform has never received much attention,” Christopher Lasch 
observed sixty years ago. Despite the distance of time, his observation still remains 
remarkably salient today. Most scholarship on the American Anti-Imperialist League 
(AIL, 1898-1920) has continued to focus narrowly on the period between its founding 
in 1898 during the Spanish-American War and the end of the U.S. war in the 
Philippines in 1902. This chronological narrowing not only sidelines the continued 
anti-imperial activities of the AIL leaders in the years that followed; it also hides U.S. 
anti-imperial efforts to thwart transimperial projects in Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
Asia-Pacific in the decades that preceded the formation of the AIL.1  
Considering that historians have long associated free trade with late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth-century Anglo-American imperialism, this story begins at what, at 
first sight, might seem an unlikely starting point: the mid-nineteenth-century Anglo-
American free-trade movement. Although this might at first bring to mind imperial 
ambitions of worldwide market access, meaning access to an entire imperial world 
system, free-trade ideas in fact spurred U.S. anti-imperialism at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Going well beyond opposition to mercantilist policies intended to 
benefit particular empires, they contained a far larger imperial critique. Paying closer 
attention to the free-trade ideas that spurred turn-of-the-century American anti-
imperialists can help us locate what Jay Sexton and Ian Tyrrell recently described as 
“the lost cosmopolitanism of anti-imperialist adherents in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.”2  
The economic cosmopolitan motivations of American anti-imperialists have 
been either misrepresented or marginalized or both.3 Recent scholarship on American 
anti-imperialist ideologies has tended to focus on culture and politics rather than 
economics.4 The older “Wisconsin School” of diplomatic history did place due 
importance upon the economic ideas of AIL leaders. However, using a New Left 
brush, the Wisconsin School took the opportunity to paint the leading turn-of-the-
century anti-imperialists as informal imperialists. Wisconsinite scholars deemed all 
forms of U.S. economic expansion – including peaceful, non-coercive foreign market 
expansion — as imperialistic.  Even the widespread pacific AIL advocacy of free-
trade internationalism struck these scholars as an example of what Wisconsin School 
founder William Appleman Williams described as “imperial anti-colonialism.”5 This 
New Left rebranding thereby hid the extent to which the era’s leading anti-
imperialists opposed not only formal imperialism but also informal economic 
imperialism.6  
This chapter argues that the AIL leadership’s widespread subscription to free-
trade ideas, emanating from the metropolitan heart of the British Empire, underpinned 
their anti-imperial moralism. The British-born free-trade ideas of the 1830s and 1840s 
– what Richard Huzzey calls “the moral economy of free trade” – conditioned the 
institutions and ideas of American anti-imperialism from the mid-nineteenth to the 
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early twentieth century, when the U.S. imperial project came to encompass large 
swaths of the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific formerly under the sway of the Spanish 
Empire.7 Businessmen and nationalists in the former Spanish colonies, desiring to 
control their own tariff policies and to have free access to the U.S. market, thereupon 
embodied the broader anti-imperialist critique of U.S. protectionist imperialism. 
American anti-imperial activism, intersecting as it did with the British, Spanish, and 
U.S. empires, must therefore be understood as a transimperial phenomenon. As 
Michael Cullinane demonstrates, the U.S. anti-imperialist movement was far from a 
purely domestic affair; strong transatlantic ties connected American anti-imperialists 
with their European counterparts.8 But this anti-imperial story is incomplete without a 
study of AIL leaders’ commitment to British free-trade ideas. Their economic 
cosmopolitanism – meaning their conviction that free-trade internationalism laid the 
economic foundations for world peace and prosperity — was a crucial component of 
what Leslie Butler describes as the AIL’s “progressive Anglo-American tradition.”9 
Their subscription to British free-trade ideas was thus also in part an attempt to 
counter the widespread prevalence of Anglophobia and empire building among the 
Republican Party’s protectionist majority.10 Considering the Anglophilia of most of 
the AIL leaders, the transatlanticism of their economic beliefs should come as little 
surprise. It should be less surprising still considering that economic ideas had long 
been entwined with Anglo-American anti-imperial debates.11  
Misrepresentations of both the turn-of-the-century American political 
economy and the ill-named Open Door Empire as free trade in character have hidden 
the radical nature of anti-imperialists’ economic cosmopolitanism. 12  The 
predominance of economic nationalist ideas and policies in late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth-century American trade politics underpinned the GOP’s push for an 
American Closed Door empire and informed the British-influenced free-trade critique 
of U.S. colonialism. Whereas Britain had turned to free trade at mid-century, 
protectionist ideas and policies triumphed in the United States from the 1860s 
onwards.13 From the crucible of the Civil War, the Republican Party emerged as the 
party of economic nationalism. It dominated the executive branch of government for 
more than half a century. Only two Democrats, Grover Cleveland (1885-89, 1893-97) 
and Woodrow Wilson (1913-21), held the presidency during the seventy-two-year 
period between 1861 and 1933. The GOP also controlled a good portion of the 
Supreme Court and Congress for much of this time, including both houses of 
Congress between 1897 and 1911, the era’s most significant period of U.S. colonial 
expansion and policymaking. 14  The resulting protectionist makeup of the U.S. 
imperial economic system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
catalyzed the economic cosmopolitanism of American anti-imperialists.  
American anti-imperial understandings of protectionist economic policies 
were shaped by a British anti-imperial free-trade tradition stretching back to the late 
eighteenth century. Writing The Wealth of Nations (1776) amid the outbreak of the 
American Revolution, Adam Smith had condemned mercantilist protectionism for 
breeding state-sponsored monopolies and for drumming up nationalistic support for 
expensive and unnecessary colonial enterprises.15 Smith’s mid-nineteenth-century 
disciples in Europe and North America, most notably the British radical politician 
Richard Cobden (1804-1865), developed this connection further, drawing a direct 
ideological line between economic nationalism and imperialism, and, conversely, 
economic cosmopolitanism and anti-imperialism. 16  In 1962, historian Oliver 
MacDonagh termed this ideological confluence of economic cosmopolitanism, peace, 
and anti-imperialism within Britain “the anti-imperialism of free trade.”17 This Anglo-
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American Cobdenite anti-imperial tradition was rich, giving birth to the even more 
radical free-trade ideas of American political philosopher Henry George in the 1870s 
and 1880s. These same free-trade ideas, crisscrossing the Atlantic between the 1840s 
and the First World War, animated anti-imperial opposition to the American Empire.  
 
Transimperial Emergence of the Economic Cosmopolitan Critique of 
Imperialism 
 
The economic cosmopolitan critique of imperialism made its controversial 
entry into mainstream British politics in the 1830s and 1840s. Its arrival was an 
internationalist offshoot of the era’s British free-trade movement. Spearheading both 
was the Liberal radical parliamentarian, Manchester manufacturer, abolitionist, and 
peace activist Richard Cobden. He and the other leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League 
(ACLL), active from 1839-1846, set out to eliminate Britain’s protective tariffs on 
foreign grain for three key reasons: to provide cheap bread to the starving masses; to 
undermine the undue political influence of the country’s militant landed elite; and to 
create a more peaceful world. Building upon the pacific internationalist elements of 
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and David Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage, Cobden and his disciples – known as Cobdenites or the Manchester School 
— believed that creating a globally integrated marketplace through free trade would 
eliminate the main political and economic causes of war and imperial expansion. 
Following the termination of the Corn Laws in 1846, Cobden and his followers set out 
to spread his anti-imperial gospel of free trade to the rest of the world. Cobden 
himself became an outspoken critic of British imperialism and a leader of the mid-
century international peace movement, as did many of his disciples within the rising 
American Empire.18  
Beyond the borders of the United Kingdom, Cobden’s economic 
cosmopolitanism found its most numerous subscribers in the American northeast. 
These American Cobdenites were involved in myriad transatlantic reform movements 
throughout the mid nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including the closely 
related international peace, anti-imperialist, and abolitionist movements.19 Cobden’s 
American free-trade disciples included abolitionists from Boston and New York City 
like William Lloyd Garrison, Charles Sumner, William Cullen Bryant, and Henry 
Ward Beecher. For these abolitionists, free trade was thought to be the next peaceful 
and prosperous step in the emancipation of mankind, whereas protectionism shackled 
consumers and laborers to the dictates of special interests, fostering in the process 
monopolies and geopolitical tensions that too often led to militarism and war.20 In the 
1850s, this radical minority of northeastern Cobdenites supported the newly formed 
Republican Party owing to its ideological dedication to free labor, free soil, and 
antislavery. The members of the Republican Party’s Cobdenite minority were well 
aware that they were outnumbered by the party’s economic nationalists, but were not 
put off; freeing American slaves was a more immediate priority than freeing 
American trade.  
When the U.S. Civil War broke out, the primary underlying cause of slavery 
was initially obfuscated across the Atlantic. As a result, Cobden and other British 
abolitionists were at first confused about its causes; the North’s initial unwillingness 
to make emancipation a war aim at first made it seem to many Britons as though the 
conflict pitted a free-trade south against a protectionist north. This common British 
misperception was corrected by 1863, owing to the propaganda efforts of various 
transatlantic Cobdenites and Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.21 Upon the war’s 
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end in 1865, these independent Republican free traders, seeing direct parallels 
between themselves and the small but well mobilized ACLL in Britain, hoped to 
duplicate British free traders’ successes.22 
The Cobdenite free-trade-and-peace movement in the United States picked up 
pace immediately following the U.S. Civil War with the founding of London’s 
Cobden Club. The club was established soon after Cobden’s 1865 death, and one of 
its goals was to overturn the American protectionist system. More broadly, the club 
desired world peace through international arbitration, noninterventionism, and free 
trade. The Cobden Club’s pacific global economic vision was enshrined in its motto: 
“Free Trade, Peace, and Goodwill among Nations.” 
In emulation of the ACLL, the American Free Trade League (AFTL) was 
established in New York City just after the Civil War in order to spread Cobdenism to 
the United States. Its founders (or marquee members) included abolitionists William 
Cullen Bryant, editor of the New York Post; Horace White, editor of the Chicago 
Tribune; Ohio politician Jacob D. Cox; and Boston’s Edward Atkinson. In the 
decades that followed, regional affiliates of this first national American Cobden Club 
popped up across the American north and west. The AFTL’s “Declaration of 
Principles” declared “Free Trade” to be “the natural and proper term in the series of 
progress after Free Speech, Free Soil and Free Labor.” The AFTL’s monthly 
newspaper, The League, was named after the ACLL’s circular, and the AFTL 
newspaper took for its motto a line from Richard Cobden, “Free-Trade: The 
International Common Law of the Almighty.” In 1868 The League, rebranding itself 
The Free-Trader, saw its circulation jump from 4,000 to 16,000 between 1869 and 
1870 alone, and its articles reportedly made their way to “nearly every newspaper in 
the United States.”23 As it grew in influence, the AFTL continued to work closely 
with London’s Cobden Club. The Cobden Club’s international membership roles, in 
turn, swelled with the addition of large numbers of AFTL members.24 
Economist and independent Republican David Ames Wells soon took charge 
of the post-Civil-War Cobdenite movement in the United States. Following a trip to 
England in the late 1860s, Wells, a protectionist, had come around to the belief that 
universal free trade was “in accordance with the teachings of nature,” and that free 
trade was “most conducive to the maintenance of international peace and to the 
prevention of wars.”25 Wells became president of the AFTL in 1871, and was 
deputized as the American secretary of the London Cobden Club not long after.  
Under Wells’s leadership, the AFTL quickly developed a nationwide 
propaganda campaign. Henry Ward Beecher, Edward Atkinson, William Lloyd 
Garrison, and legalist David Dudley Field, among others, lent the American free-trade 
movement added gravitas and publicity with their AFTL-sponsored speaking tours 
across the country. Other notable early AFTL members included transcendentalist 
Ralph Waldo Emerson; Reverend Joshua Leavitt, founder of the Liberty Party; the 
founding editor of the Nation, E. L. Godkin; and a young journalist from San 
Francisco named Henry George.26 
A desire to ease Anglo-American tensions helped motivate transatlantic Cobdenite 
peace and anti-imperial efforts, especially when it came to Canadian-American 
relations. Cobdenite critics of imperialism and war shared a desire to end Canadian-
American conflict, which loomed large in the years after 1865 thanks to Fenian 
radicalism and calls for U.S. annexation, by liberalizing trade between the British 
settler colony and the United States.27  
British émigré Goldwin Smith took a lead role in the North American free-trade-
and-peace movement. The English-born radical journalist and Cobden Club member 
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had been the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford before immigrating to the 
United States in 1868 to teach at Cornell University. Finding the anti-British 
sentiment of the times too much to handle, Smith moved to Toronto three years after 
his American arrival.28 There he became probably the most outspoken Cobdenite 
advocate of devolving the British Empire through the emancipation of its colonies 
while maintaining informal free-trade relations. Pro-imperial opponents dubbed this 
the “Manchester Colonial Theory.” 
Thanks to the efforts of Goldwin Smith, the Cobdenite Manchester School’s 
call for devolving imperial control over the colonies had become popular in Canada at 
mid-century. Smith was among the most prominent within the Manchester School in 
criticizing the British Empire for being atavistic, undemocratic, and unnecessarily 
expensive. He and others of the Manchester School instead advocated for the empire’s 
devolution and dissolution, which earned them the diminutive moniker “Little 
Englanders.” They proposed instead that the ties between the motherland and her 
colonies could peacefully and profitably be maintained through free trade, free 
migration, and friendly relations.29 As early as 1863, Smith had advocated for greater 
political and fiscal autonomy for the empire’s settler colonies, and he became a vocal 
proponent of Canadian independence. After Canadian confederation in 1867, Smith 
became the leader of the Canadian movement for commercial union between Canada 
and the United States. For Smith, it was only natural that the two countries should 
become economically integrated, considering their already strong trade links, 
alongside their common Anglo-Saxon heritage and geographic proximity. 
Goldwin Smith found numerous free-trade-and-peace allies among America’s 
Cobdenite Anglophiles. The AFTL lobbied on behalf of Canadian-American trade 
reciprocity, and David Ames Wells, William Cullen Bryant, Arthur Latham Perry, 
and Cyrus Field also lent their support to the short-lived American Commercial 
Reciprocity League with the aim of informing U.S. public opinion about the potential 
benefits of Canadian-American trade liberalization. AFTL and Cobden Club member 
Henry George, in his popular book Protection or Free Trade (1886), similarly 
advocated for Canadian-American free trade, “fraternity and peace” to counter the 
era’s “spirit of protectionism . . . national enmity and strife.”30 These North American 
Manchester School efforts claimed tangible success in the late 1880s when the 
Canadian Liberal Party endorsed American commercial union in its party platform. 
Canada’s protectionist Conservative Party instead supported closer trade ties within 
the British Empire through a policy of imperial trade preference. Following 
Republican passage of the protectionist McKinley Tariff of 1890 (which excluded 
Canada from establishing reciprocal trade with the United States), the Conservatives 
narrowly came out on top in Canada’s 1891 federal election, and with it came further 
Canadian-American trade disputes and mutual fears of military invasion by one side 
or the other for decades to come.31 
 In the Caribbean sphere, American Cobdenite leaders similarly opposed the 
Republican Party’s imperial designs on annexing Santo Domingo in the 1870s and 
1880s. In 1870, former Ohio governor and AFTL co-founder Jacob D. Cox resigned 
as U.S. Grant’s Interior Minister over the annexation issue; Charles Sumner was 
forced out of his chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee owing to 
his opposition; and David Wells was fired from his position as Special Commissioner 
of the Revenue.32 When the Republicans again raised the specter of annexation in the 
early 1880s, New York City’s R. R. Bowker asked why the United States should not 
instead try to gain access to the markets of Santo Domingo “without the cost of 
annexation” through the anti-imperialism of free trade? And why limit U.S. market 
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expansion just to Santo Domingo, when the United States might also trade freely with 
South America, Canada, the whole world even, thereby making America “the apostle 
among nations of the gospel of ‘peace on earth, good-will among men’”?33  
New Left scholars have portrayed calls like Bowker’s for free trade with Santo 
Domingo and the world as bids for informal imperialism. Through a neo-Marxist lens, 
all forms of foreign market expansion appeared imperialistic, regardless of the tactics, 
ideologies, or policies involved in expanding U.S. trade abroad. But Bowker did not 
join with the economic nationalists of the Republican Party in calling for coercively 
opening up the markets of the world; rather, he suggested that the U.S. adopt free 
trade as an anti-imperial policy for peaceful market expansion through mutual “good 
will.”  Much as MacDonagh argued for British Cobdenites, the U.S. Cobdenite 
espousal of the anti-imperialism of free trade should not be misconstrued as informal 
imperialism. 
That said, some American anti-imperialists did gaze upon the British Empire 
with rose-tinted glasses owing to their Anglo-Saxonist leanings. For some of the most 
extreme Cobdenite Anglophiles, their belief in the superiority of what they considered 
to be a shared Anglo-Saxonism informed their belief that British free trade was not 
only good for the United States but also for the world. This meant that even as 
American anti-imperialists demonstrated a critical awareness of the Republican 
Party’s imperialism of economic nationalism, they sometimes turned a blind eye to 
the coercive implementation of British free-trade imperialism in places like India and 
South America.34 But such instances were exceptional cases, rather than the rule. As 
Patterson notes, by and large “while they admired the British tradition of liberty and 
British achievements in literature, commerce, and industry, they had little sympathy 
with British imperialism.” They were careful to distinguish “between its ‘false’ 
imperialistic tradition of Benjamin Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, and Cecil Rhodes 
and the ‘true’ England of Richard Cobden, John Bright, John Morley, and William 
Gladstone, all anti-imperial Liberals.”35  
Inspired by these British anti-imperial Liberals, American Cobdenites were able to 
steer American anti-imperial policies more directly during the two non-consecutive 
Democratic administrations of Grover Cleveland (1885-89, 1893-97). President 
Cleveland surrounded himself with American Cobdenites as cabinet appointments 
(including his secretaries of state, war, agriculture, treasury, and the interior) and as 
unofficial economic advisors. As a result, Cleveland’s administrations sought out 
more amicable Anglo-American relations, and demonstrated a clear Cobdenite 
propensity for foreign policy non-interventionism and trade liberalization to create a 
more peaceful world order.  
The new administration’s anti-imperial leanings became evident almost as soon as 
Cleveland entered the White House in 1885 through its opposition to Republican 
imperial projects in Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific.  In Latin America, 
for example, whereas Republican economic nationalists like James G. Blaine of 
Maine – the Republican presidential nominee in 1884 – sought U.S. imperial control 
over any canal attempts in Central America, Cleveland and his cabinet opposed the 
Republican Party’s planned construction of a Nicaraguan canal and the annexation of 
the territory surrounding it.36 Cleveland’s protectionist opponents were quick to attack 
the Cleveland administration’s early Cobdenite anti-imperial tendencies and pro-
British sympathies.  
With regard to Africa, Cleveland and his Cobdenites continued their opposition to 
coercive Republican imperialism by distancing the United States from the previous 
administration’s imperial designs in the Congo, where the issue of free trade once 
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again played a controversial role. American Cobdenites looked askance upon the 
1884 Berlin Conference resolutions and their implications for possible U.S. territorial 
annexation and political entanglements in Africa, despite attempts by proponents of 
the imperialistic resolutions to couch the initiative in free-trade verbiage.37 In 1885 
Cleveland and his cabinet were quick to revoke U.S. recognition of the Berlin treaty 
and refused to submit it for congressional approval.38  
In the Asia-Pacific, Cleveland’s Cobdenite anti-imperial approach once again 
contrasted with that of his Republican counterparts when, in a January 1887 special 
message to Congress, Cleveland “insisted that autonomy and independence of Samoa 
should be scrupulously preserved.” At the Washington Conference held later that 
year, Cleveland’s Cobdenite secretary of state, Thomas Bayard, fought for Samoan 
independence, insisting that “the independence and autonomy” of Samoa “be 
preserved free from the control or preponderating influence of any foreign 
government.” Cleveland thereafter attempted to devolve American informal influence 
entirely from Samoa during his second administration.39 Upon entering the Oval 
Office for a second term in early 1893, Cleveland also reversed his Republican 
presidential predecessor’s recent attempts to annex Hawai’i. Cobdenite Carl Schurz 
lobbied the cabinet against annexation and Roger Q. Mills denounced annexation in 
the Senate. Pro-free-trade news outlets like the New York World, the New York Times, 
the New York Evening Post, and the Nation castigated Hawaii’s U.S.-dominated 
“Sugar Trust” for fomenting the annexationist agitation.40 From the Congo to Samoa 
to Hawaii, Cleveland’s Cobdenites had begun implementing the anti-imperialism of 
free trade. 
When Cleveland’s Cobdenites denied the Republican economic nationalists their 
colonial prizes in the Asia-Pacific, they took aim at the cabinet’s British-influenced 
anti-imperialism of free trade. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) railed against the 
Democratic Party’s abandonment of its once-great Jeffersonian legacy of territorial 
expansion. He charged the Cleveland Administration with conspiring “to overthrow 
American interests and American control in Hawaii” and “to abandon Samoa.” The 
Democratic leadership had “been successfully Cobdenized.” This was “the underlying 
reason for their policy of retreat. . . . We have had something too much of these 
disciples of the Manchester school.” Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge’s protégé, privately 
expressed similar sentiments to Lodge: “As you say, thank God I am not a free-trader. 
In this country pernicious indulgence in the doctrine of free trade seems inevitably to 
produce fatty degeneration of the moral fibre.” He also suggested that the 
incarceration of the pro-free-trade, “peace at any price men” editors of the New York 
Evening Post and the New York World would bring him “great pleasure.”41  
Roosevelt and Lodge’s protectionist worries about the demise of the American 
imperial spirit proved to be unwarranted. The timing of the U.S. declaration of war 
against the Spanish Empire soon after William McKinley, the GOP’s “Napoleon of 
Protection,” moved into the White House and the Republicans gained control of both 
houses of Congress in 1897 was no coincidence.  The subsequent colonial spoils 
catalyzed renewed anti-imperial mobilization from American economic 
cosmopolitans. 
 
The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade’s Transimperial Crossings 
 
The anti-imperialism of free trade crossed into the transimperial terrain of the 
Spanish Empire in 1898. The AIL, founded by American Cobdenites soon after the 
outbreak of the Spanish-American War, became the country’s most visible U.S. anti-
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imperialist organization, with local chapters spread throughout the country. Historians 
long have noted how the anti-imperialists of 1898 were a diverse group. But AIL 
officers were connected by the underappreciated common denominator of the 
transimperial free-trade movement. Tracing the history of the American Cobdenite 
free-trade movement illuminates how the vast majority of AIL officers were free 
traders involved in a variety of Cobdenite free-trade-and-peace organizations [Figure 
1]. Their subscription to peaceful economic cosmopolitanism was, for many of them, 
foundational to their anti-imperial activism. They opposed the formal American 
colonial acquisitions obtained from the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean and the Asia 
Pacific, as well as the subsequent informal coercive protectionist policies that the 
GOP forced upon Cuba and the formal U.S. colonies of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the 
Philippines. 
 
 
Figure 1: “The Economic Cosmopolitanism of the AIL.” The above graph 
illustrates the ideological prevalence of free trade among the officers of the AIL.	
An ideological adherence to Cobdenite free-trade principles, particularly its 
close association with peace and anti-imperialism, moved AIL leaders to action after 
1898. Their anti-imperialism of free trade was put on further display in their post-
1898 opposition to the informal and formal economic dimensions of what April 
Merleaux calls the “U.S. sugar empire.”42 Beginning with the 1901 Downes v. Bidwell 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court legalized the protectionist framework of the 
American closed-door empire by allowing the federal government to levy tariffs 
against the country’s own colonies so as to insulate domestic U.S. sugar growers from 
competition with the empire’s newly acquired sugar-producing colonies. American 
Cobdenites unsuccessfully opposed this economic nationalist imperial legislation. For 
example, Erving Winslow, an officer of both the AIL and the American Free Trade 
League, was quick to castigate the Supreme Court decision because it meant that not 
just Puerto Rico but also the Philippines would remain “outside the Constitution,” and 
their tariff rates “subject to the arbitrary power of Congress.”43 AIL leaders continued 
to oppose subsequent instances of informal U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean. In 
1915, for example, AIL officer Jane Addams led the Woman’s Peace Party, a 
women’s suffrage and free-trade-and-peace organization, against the Wilson 
Administration’s attempt to coerce Haiti into signing a treaty granting twenty years of 
U.S. control over its finances and customs.44 
Opposition to U.S. closed-door imperialism expanded into an even broader 
transimperial phenomenon once local critics among the former colonies of the 
Spanish Empire joined the free-trade fight. Cubans and Filipinos were among the 
loudest in voicing their dissent against U.S. imperialism of economic nationalism.  
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Cuba became an American informal colony after the island gained ostensible 
independence from Spain in 1898. The question of Cuban-American trade reciprocity 
soon followed. In 1902, it became one of the most hotly debated issues in Congress. 
Republican imperialists, at odds with both the AIL and anti-expansionists within their 
own party, wanted to implement protectionist reciprocity and control the island’s 
finances and foreign trade. Cuban nationalists instead lobbied Congress for Cuban-
American trade liberalization and greater local autonomy over the island’s tariff 
policy. To this end, Luis V. de Abad, representing the tobacco interests and “all the 
laboring classes” of Cuba, asked the U.S. House Committee on Reciprocity with Cuba 
for a substantial decrease on the duties on Cuban cigars and raw tobacco. He argued 
that these protective tariffs were artificially lowering profits and creating 
unemployment on the island, added to which, “under the United States tariff it has 
been impossible for us to go into any foreign market.” Luis V. Placé from Havana, 
representing a prominent group of Cuban merchants called the Corporaciones 
Económicas, argued that “as a Cuban I would like to give the United States free trade. 
The whole of American products imported into Cuba ought to be free . . . the proper 
solution of the Cuban problem is virtually free trade with both countries.” In doing so, 
he also expressed his awareness of the issue’s imperial power dynamics: “I ask for 
free trade on the understanding it is for you to grant it; we beg.”45  
The final version of the reciprocity treaty was a far cry from the free-trade 
version requested by the AIL, Cuban merchants, and independence leaders, as it only 
ended up providing a twenty percent discount on U.S. tariff rates. Disillusioned 
independence leaders like Juan Gualberto Gómez, head of Cuba’s Liberal Party and an	 ally	 of	 José	 Martí	 in	 the	 Cuban	 independence	 movement,	 came	 out	 in	opposition	to	reciprocity	in	its	final	form	because,	according	to	Mary	Speck,	the	U.S.	 “had	 shown	 so	 little	 commitment	 to	 free	 trade.”	 Other	 Cuban	 nationalists,	however,	 gave	 their	 pragmatic	 support	 to	 the	 treaty,	 warning	 that	 to	 do	otherwise	would	risk	U.S.	annexation.	For	them	the	message	was	clear;	Cubans	must	either	embrace	U.S.	informal	imperialism	through	protectionist	reciprocity	or	risk	formal	U.S.	colonialism.46		A	handful	of	years	later,	the	side	effects	of	the	Republican	Party’s	closed-door	 policy	 toward	 the	 Philippines	 were	 beginning	 to	 show.	 The	 U.S.	government’s	 protectionist	 policies	 were	 creating	 high	 prices	 on	 basic	necessities,	 harming	 poverty-stricken	 Filipino	 consumers	 and	 various	 local	businesses. 47 	The	 protectionist	 policies	 soon	 sparked	 Filipino	 nationalist	protests. On July 11, 1908, a large gathering took place in Manila, “to endorse the 
mass petition for the free entry of Philippine goods to American markets . . . 
prompted by the apparent indifference of the U.S. Senate” to the ill effects of its 
colonial protectionist policies. These 300 Filipino businessmen convened what 
became the Philippines’s first Committee on Free Trade. Its officers included pro-
independence advocate Pedro Guevera, future member of the Philippine Congress 
(1909-1912, 1916-1922) and the Nationalist Resident Commissioner for the 
Philippines (1923-1936); and Don Luis Hidalgo, a trade unionist and co-founder, in 
1903, of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Similar meetings were held 
across the islands, resulting in the signatures of thousands of supporters.48 The GOP’s 
turn-of-the-century protectionist imperial policies thus garnered substantial opposition 
not only from the AIL, but also nationalists in Cuba and the Philippines. 
 
Free Trade Radicalism’s Anti-Imperial Networks 
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The transimperial dimensions of this anti-imperial story become even more 
visible through closer examination of the Cobdenite ideas at play. Digging deep into 
the economic cosmopolitanism of the AIL reveals that free-trade ideas crossed the 
Atlantic in both directions. One particular Cobdenite offshoot was the free-trade 
ideology that became known in the United States as the single tax or Georgism, 
named after the American journalist and political economist Henry George. George’s 
ideas crisscrossed U.S. and British imperial boundaries, becoming the leading vein of 
U.S. free-trade thinking to influence British Cobdenites. 
The positions of George’s followers on both sides of the Atlantic concerning 
free trade, anti-imperialism, and peace became even more radical than those of the 
more orthodox followers of the Manchester School. George first formulated his single 
tax theory – which held that a country could derive all of its revenue through a direct 
tax on the potential value of land – in his internationally bestselling book Progress 
and Poverty (1879). This single tax on land, according to George, was a panacea that 
would at once provide a steady revenue stream for local and federal governments; 
discourage land monopolization by incentivizing land development; and eliminate the 
need for all other forms of direct and indirect taxation, including tariffs. For George 
and his followers on both sides of the Atlantic, eliminating land monopolies and all 
other barriers to trade would undermine the economic causes of imperialism and war 
and thus bring prosperity and peace to the world.  
George considered his land tax proposal a natural outgrowth of the 
transatlantic Cobdenite free-trade-and-peace tradition. Indeed, land reform had long 
been tied to Cobdenism, as George and his transatlantic disciples were keen to 
emphasize. In 1898, for example, amid scathing critiques of President McKinley’s 
warmongering and autocratic maneuverings, the second issue of the newly launched 
Georgist publication the Public emphasized the movement’s Cobdenite connections.49 
Georgists maintained their strong opposition to American colonialism through the 
Public and in their involvement in the AIL.50 
George himself had converted from protectionism to Cobdenism in the 1860s, 
at which point he put his faith “in the international law of God as Cobden called free 
trade.” George became an American member of the Cobden Club in 1881, taking an 
active role in various American Cobden Clubs, including the AFTL and the New 
York Free Trade Club.  Following his conversion to Cobdenism, George aligned 
himself politically with the independent Republican Cobdenites who became known 
as Mugwumps after they threw their support behind Cleveland in the 1884 
presidential election. He praised Cleveland’s 1887 message to Congress as “a manly, 
vigorous, and most effective free-trade speech,” and stumped for Cleveland’s 
reelection amid the “Great Debate” of 1888.51 George again supported Cleveland’s 
1892 presidential run, predicting to his friend and single tax disciple Louis F. Post 
that a world united “in the bonds of commerce and its guarantee of peace among the 
nations” was now near at hand.52  
Following the 1879 publication of Progress and Poverty, George and his 
growing transatlantic following argued that Georgism was a natural extension of 
Cobdenism. Because of this, his single tax theory found an even stronger reception 
within Free Trade England than it did in Protectionist America. George himself spent 
a great deal of time during the 1880s travelling between the United States and Great 
Britain in an effort to popularize his free-trade ideas. The first British edition of 
Progress and Poverty appeared in 1881. It sold 100,000 copies within three years, 
spurring George to claim that his book had “circulated in Great Britain as no 
economic work had ever circulated before.” His arrest and imprisonment during an 
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1881 visit to Ireland as a reporter for the Irish World only lent his ideas more 
transatlantic notoriety and sympathy in advance of his subsequent lecture tours in 
Britain. His radical ideas swept across Great Britain from the early 1880s onward, and 
modified versions of his single tax theory were adopted by Liberal and Labour Party 
platforms at the turn of the century.53 Jane Cobden – a daughter of Richard Cobden 
and active in Britain’s turn-of-the-century anti-imperial, Irish home rule, free trade, 
and women’s suffrage movements – was among those sympathetic to Georgism. She 
connected the single tax movement to her father’s mid-century push for “free trade in 
land,” as did other British Cobdenites fired up by George’s single tax philosophy.54  
Even though Georgism was too radical for some orthodox Cobdenites in the 
United States, the two wings remained wedded to the transatlantic anti-imperialist 
struggle. Their internal differences over fiscal reform stemmed mainly from the fact 
that the Georgist position took an even more absolutist stance on free trade than did 
the Cobdenite doctrine that inspired it. In particular, where orthodox Cobdenites 
supported indirect taxation through minimal tariffs for revenue purposes only, 
George’s new proposal suggested that all tariffs – and every other form of taxation, 
for that matter – ought to be replaced by a single direct tax on the estimated value of 
land. Georgists thus expounded a more absolute commitment to free trade than 
orthodox Cobdenites. Nevertheless, despite their differences in degree concerning 
free-trade cosmopolitanism, the two Cobdenite camps stood side-by-side in their 
common causes of anti-imperialism and peace through the AIL and other anti-
imperialist and peace organizations between 1898 and 1920. 
The transimperial ties between Cobdenite anti-imperialists on both sides of the 
Atlantic grew substantially with the addition of George and his disciples, and were 
strengthened further through the efforts of AIL officers Lucia and Edwin D. Mead. 
Lucia was, according to John M. Craig, “an uncompromising adherent to ‘free trade’ 
economic theories” and opposed U.S. colonialism, navalism, and the Monroe 
Doctrine. Edwin was a member of the New England Free Trade League and the 
American Peace Society, a co-founder of the Twentieth Century Club, and director of 
the World Peace Foundation upon its founding in 1910. Lucia and Edwin’s peace 
internationalist worldviews crystalized following a trip to England in 1901, where 
they met with pro-Boer editor William T. Stead and British Cobdenite J. A. Hobson.55 
Hobson’s critiques of the Boer War had a sizeable impact upon Lucia and Edwin’s 
subsequent anti-imperial critiques. Lucia described their private meetings with 
Hobson and other British anti-imperialists as an “intellectual Thanksgiving.”56   
Soon thereafter, Edwin’s Twentieth Century Club in Boston invited Hobson 
and fellow British anti-imperialist George H. Perris to lunch with the members of the 
New England branch of the AIL in late 1902, just as Hobson’s Imperialism: A Study 
was making its transatlantic debut.57 Hobson again addressed the AIL in 1903. Perris, 
an anti-militarist and absolute pacifist likewise furthered transimperial ties through his 
anti-imperialist lecture tour that took him to seven U.S. cities. The American Peace 
Society’s publication The Advocate of Peace reported that Perris’s last lecture, at 
Cooper Union, New York, garnered around 1,000 attendees.58 It was also more than 
coincidental that Hobsonian critiques of U.S. financial imperialism became more 
pronounced at AIL meetings and in American anti-imperial critiques during and after 
Hobson and Perris’s U.S. visit.59 Nor did Hobson shy away from criticizing the U.S. 
protectionist system in the years to come.60 
Even as more orthodox Cobdenites like Hobson strengthened the lines of 
communication within the transatlantic anti-imperial movement, Georgist Cobdenites 
were working across Anglo-American imperial boundaries to argue for anti-imperial 
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policies. The propagandistic efforts of Joseph and Mary Fels, for example, built upon 
these anti-imperial networks following their relocation to London from Philadelphia. 
Joseph, a wealthy retired U.S. soap manufacturer and AIL officer, and his wife Mary 
– a radical suffragist and peace advocate who eventually became the editor of the 
anti-imperial Georgist publication the Public — provided the single tax movement in 
Britain with much-needed financial bolstering at the turn of the century. Georgist 
reformers in Britain were among the main recipients of the Fels’s international 
largesse, leading to the formation of the United League for the Taxation of Land 
Values (as the Georgist movement was known in Britain), as well as numerous local 
chapters scattered throughout the British Empire. The league sought to spread 
George’s land policies throughout the British colonies, and thereby break up the land 
monopolies of the empire’s aristocratic elites. Writing from London, Joseph laid this 
out in an open letter to Andrew Carnegie in 1910 entitled “Free Trade and the Single 
Tax vs. Imperialism.” In it, Joseph argued that “if conditions of absolute free trade 
had prevailed,” there would have been no Russo-Japanese war and no need for U.S. 
control of the Philippines.  
 
If Japan maintained no custom houses, the power that would try 
to rob her of her independence would have nothing to gain and 
very little to lose. Henry George made this clear in his 
Protection or Free Trade. . . . the interests which dragged the 
United States into the disgraceful Philippine adventure would 
not and could not have succeeded in doing so, had not the 
existence of land monopoly at home made it evident that the 
same institution would surely be continued by our government 
in the Philippines. 
 
The unnatural “need of foreign markets,” he continued, “which is so frequently used 
as an argument to justify wars of criminal aggression is a ‘need’ that would not be felt 
if the aggressing nation enforced justice at home” through adoption of the single tax 
and absolute free trade with the world.61 As Mary similarly described it in 1916 just 
before taking part in the transatlantic travails of the Ford Peace Expedition, free trade 
through Georgist land reform would undermine colonialism by dismantling imperial 
demands for foreign markets and transportation networks wrought from protective 
tariffs.62  
Anti-imperial and peace leaders like Joseph and Mary Fels thus believed that 
Georgism would undermine imperial expansion in three key ways. First, developing 
land to maximum efficiency would increase the global supply of raw materials, 
thereby undercutting a principal driver of imperial expansion. Second, it would 
undermine the militant influence of the landed aristocracy, a long-held goal of 
Georgists and orthodox Cobdenites alike. Third, absolute free trade would eliminate 
the market inefficiencies wrought from protectionism and monopolies, which they 
believed to be another key force behind the imperial search for foreign markets. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It may seem ironic that some of the leading anti-imperialist theories in the 
turn-of-the-twentieth century United States came from the leading empire of the day, 
but transimperial crossings were never limited to strategies of imperial rule; they also 
advanced anti-imperial dissent. Transatlantic free-trade cosmopolitanism – whether 
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orthodox Cobdenism or its more radical Georgist variant – fueled a major strain of 
Anglo-American anti-imperialism from the 1840s until the AIL’s dissolution in 1920. 
The vast majority of AIL officers were Cobdenite free traders, influenced by British 
anti-imperialist thought. In a time of U.S. political, military, and economic assertion, 
they drew on principles expounded by British radicals.   
The anti-imperialism of free trade was a transimperial phenomenon that came 
to encompass the British, American, and Spanish Empires. Especially in the British 
Empire and its rising American associate, Cobdenites struggled to replace the 
economic logic that undergirded imperialism with the free-trade principles they 
believed would undermine empire and foster peace. This association of free trade with 
anti-imperialism, in turn, was also embraced among businessmen, consumers, and 
nationalists within U.S. colonies in the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific following the 
Spanish-American War. Travelling across imperial boundaries, anti-imperial 
economic theories sought to undo the world that had produced them. 																																																								
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